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ABSTRACT 
 
Taking into account the global expansion that certain traditional financial practices like 
hawala have experienced in the last decades, it is undeniable that both cultural diversity 
and different moral perceptions have become relevant questions in the international 
financial arena. Consequently, hawala, an ancient financial system profoundly rooted in 
Islamic moral traditions, offers an extraordinary setting to explore over a real institution 
the theoretical debate about the potential universality of ethics. Moreover, hawala makes 
us think over the relationship among legality, formality and morality.  
This paper discusses the economic, social and ethical features of hawala, in order to 
shed some light into the question of whether diverse economic phenomena may be 
judged under Western standards or rather it is necessary to appeal to a superior body of 
universal values, respectful with the different cultures and religions. The authors show 
that the current —legalistic— approach to hawala results overly partial and biased. 
Therefore they conclude that it is essential to bring about a change towards a more 
ethically, culturally and economically sensitive approach, which would enable hawala to 
develop its full potential and become a vehicle for financial and economic development. 
It is necessary to consider the “hyper-norms” and fundamental principles inherent to 
humanity, which are common to both “formal” and “informal”, “Western” and “non-
Western” financial practices, when designing a legal framework for these cultural 
financial traditions. 
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Abstract 
Taking into account the global expansion that certain traditional financial 
practices like hawala have experienced in the last decades, it is undeniable that both 
cultural diversity and different moral perceptions have become relevant questions in 
the international financial arena. Consequently, hawala, an ancient financial system 
profoundly rooted in Islamic moral traditions, offers an extraordinary setting to 
explore over a real institution the theoretical debate about the potential universality 
of ethics. Moreover, hawala makes us think over the relationship among legality, 
formality and morality. 
This paper discusses the economic, social and ethical features of hawala, in 
order to shed some light into the question of whether diverse economic phenomena 
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may be judged under Western standards or rather it is necessary to appeal to a 
superior body of universal values, respectful with the different cultures and religions. 
The authors show that the current —legalistic— approach to hawala results overly 
partial and biased. Therefore they conclude that it is essential to bring about a change 
towards a more ethically, culturally and economically sensitive approach, which 
would enable hawala to develop its full potential and become a vehicle for financial 
and economic development. It is necessary to consider the “hyper-norms” and 
fundamental principles inherent to humanity, which are common to both “formal” and 
“informal”, “Western” and “non-Western” financial practices, when designing a legal 
framework for these cultural financial traditions. 
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Cultural Financial Traditions and Universal Ethics: the Case of Hawala 
 
In the wake of concern for global security after 9/11, the international 
community and financial authorities increased their interest for informal customary 
financial practices —especially for hawala— that until then they had been virtually 
unregulated and unsupervised, and which became suspected of being an important 
channel for the financing of terrorism (Napoleoni, 2003). Hawala is an ancient 
banking practice, deeply rooted in Islamic moral traditions and based on trust that 
enables the transfer or remittance of money between two parties in a fast and 
inexpensive manner, without the direct involvement of a financial institution —such 
as a bank or a money transfer. Thus, in this sense, the transactions are “informal”. In 
the last decades hawala has experienced a significant expansion on a global scale as a 
result of the globalization and the phenomena associated with it. Although there are 
not reliable estimates about the dimension of hawala, it is commonly accepted that it 
constitutes a widespread practice in many non-Western countries. In these regions, it 
prevails the perception that “hawala serves more than half of the world, far more than 
conventional banking, and serves it well” (Houssein, 2005, p. 88).  
Years after the events of September 11 that launched hawala to the forefront of 
political and financial regulatory debates, hawala has acquired a new significance in 
the scenario of the global financial crisis. On the one hand, a growing body of 
literature has emphasized the relationships between financial crisis and poor 
regulation, in a broad sense of term (Cecchetti, 2009; Coval et al, 2009; Poole, 2010; 
Jackson, 2010). In order to prevent recurrences, there are proposals that target not 
only the global regulation of the formal financial system (Basel Committee on Banking 
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Supervision, 2009) but also the so-called shadow/informal banking system —that 
comprises hawala. On the other hand, financial institutions that are based on core 
tenets of Islam —namely the Islamic banking industry, even though hawala also falls 
in this category— appear to have avoided many of the most severe consequences of 
the crisis although they exhibit important regulatory challenges (Hassan and Dridi 
2010; Mohieldin, 2012). Consequently, hawala calls for new effective regulations and 
controls, which shall respect the moral values and principles upon which the system is 
based. However, as Blodgett (2011) shows, the relationships between law/regulation 
and ethics are never easy. Difficulties increase on a global and interdependent context. 
Thus, as global institution that is simultaneously —and partially— out of 
formal financial system and alien to Occidental ethical standards, hawala offers an 
extraordinary setting to project the theoretical discussion about globalization, culture 
and ethics. It enables to explore the debate about the potential universality of ethics, 
which nourishes the three-pronged argument of whether cross-cultural and timeless 
ethical norms exist, to which extent the search for common universal moral values is 
the solution to cultural diversity and what their role in the current globalization 
process is. 
This paper offers an overview of the current position of hawala on the global 
financial scenario followed by a discussion of the ethical problems associated with it.  
In the last decade, there has been a growing body of research that has analyzed 
different aspects of hawala —such as, for instance, policy recommendation (Passas, 
2005, 2006a; Nakhasi, 2007; Zagaris, 2007; Bowers, 2009; Wang 2011), the 
relationship with illicit activities (Passas, 1999, 2003, 2004; Bala, 2004; Felman, 2006; 
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Thompson, 2006; Keene, 2007; Van de Bunt, 2008a, 2008b) and its consequences 
(Glushenko, 2005)— and the so-called alternative remittance systems, but the ethical 
dimension of these practices has been significantly neglected in the literature. 
Moreover, hawala is an exceptional testing ground for studying issues related to the 
universal-particular dilemma of ethical principles. Hence, we proceed as follow. First, 
we depict the scenario where hawala is discussed today. Then, we offer an overview 
of the hawala practices; the main characteristics of the transactions, their connection 
with trade activity, we depict how trust and reputation become essential pillars of the 
system and we outline the main uses it receives. Next we discuss the ethical 
dimension of hawala in order to shed some light into the issue of whether economic 
phenomena from different cultures such hawala may be judged under Western 
standards or rather it is necessary to appeal to a superior body of universal values, 
respectful with the different cultures and religions. We conclude by highlighting some 
final remarks.  
 
The context 
Hawala is an Arabic term that denotes “transfer” —the root H-w-l means 
“transform” or “change”. When adopted into Hindi and Urdu, it gained the additional 
meaning of “trust” and “reference” (Jost and Sandhu, 2000; Thompson, 2008) and 
when it passed into French —Aval (Grashoff, 1889)— the expression acquired the 
connotation of “guarantee”.  
Hawala is one of the main instruments of credit provided by Islamic 
commercial law. In legal terms hawala is understood as the payment of a debt through 
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the transfer of a claim1. But this mechanism also enables to make payments in another 
place through an intermediary2.  
It seems puzzling that today’s understanding of the mechanics of a hawala 
transaction is quite different from its legal definition. Nowadays, the standard hawala 
transaction can be described as follows. A client in a city A (CA) wants to send certain 
amount of money to another person that is located in a different city B (CB). Hence, 
the client (CA) approaches a hawala dealer —called hawaladar— (HA) to request the 
transfer of the money. This hawaladar (HA) offers to arrange the transfer applying a 
given exchange rate —in the case where the funds are to be delivered in a foreign 
currency— and usually he charges a fee for his services. If the remitting client (CA) 
agrees on the terms, she gives the money to the hawaladar (HA) in the local currency 
or in a different convertible currency. Then, the hawaladar (HA) contacts —via fax, 
email or by phone— with another hawaladar (HB) in the country of destination who 
organizes the delivery of the funds to the recipient (CB). The beneficiary (CB) receives 
the money in local currency usually within few hours since the remitting person (CA) 
ordered the transfer. As a result of this operation there is an outstanding debt 
between both hawaladars that will have to be cancelled in the future (see figure 1).  
In fact, as El-Gamal (2006, p. 206) explains, “what is called hawala nowadays is 
much closer to the suftaja procedure”. Suftaja3 is the other main instrument of credit, 
                                                        
1 “I assign to A a claim of mine against B, in order to satisfy a claim of A against me”(Schacht, (1964) 
1982, p. 149). 
2 “I owe something to A and charge B to pay my debt” (Schacht, 1982, pp. 148-149).  
3 The word suftaja originally comes from the Persian and it means “a bill of exchange or letter of credit” 
(Steingass, 1963, p.684). 
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usually cited along with hawala in Islamic legal texts. Suftaja is defined as a loan of 
money in order to avoid the risk of transport4. In essence, the difference between 
hawala and suftaja is that in former there is supposed to be an obligation5 already 
existing, whereas in the latter that obligation is just created with the loan of money6 
(Schacht, 1982). In the Middle Ages the suftaja concept gradually disappeared from 
the Arabic language and the hawala was used instead for naming these type of 
transfer operations in general. 
Therefore, from the perspective of today’s understanding of the mechanics of 
hawala, the clients that use the system to remit funds operate according to the suftaja 
scheme whereas hawaladars, that compensate and consolidate obligations for the 
settlement of their accounts, use the hawala transfer of debts. 
There is no clear reference of when the concept of hawala first appeared. 
Razavy (2005) and Thompson (2008) advocate that the practice existed before its 
codification in Islamic law, which is in the line with Schacht’s (1955, p. 28) 
observation: “Islamic law was created by Islam, but the raw material out of which it 
was formed was to a great extent non-Islamic”. 
Hawala became a common practice in the extensive medieval Islamic 
commercial activity but it gradually lessened its popularity when Islamic countries fell 
under the influence of West European countries in the colonialism era. Yet, hawala 
never ceased to exist and throughout history, it has shown a great capacity to adapt to 
a variety of circumstances, such as wars, economic crisis, blockades, different political 
                                                        
4 “I lend an amount to B, in order that he may pay it to A in another place”(Schacht, 1982, pp. 149) 
5 Of B towards me. 
6 By a payment which I make to B. 
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regimes or failed states, and it has been a powerful resource whenever the formal and 
public institutions were dysfunctional or nonexistent. In the last decades, 
globalization —particularly the migratory movements, the development of 
communication technologies, and the ease of engagement in the international 
economy and the global financial system— has enabled the renaissance and 
expansion of hawala networks on a global scale. 
 In the aftermath of the terrorist attacks of September 11, hawala became 
related to terrorist financing. Although there was “no evidence that the 9/11 
conspirators employed hawala as a means to move the money that funded the 
operation” (9/11 Commission, 2004, p. 499), the system became stereotyped as an 
illicit financial structure linked to Islamic fundamentalism and terrorism. Since then, 
hawala has remained in the eye of the storm for international financial regulation. On 
October 2001, the Financial Action Task Force (FATF) realized the special 
recommendations on terrorist financing that complement the 40 recommendations 
against money laundering, one of which was intended to combat the abuse of the 
so-called “alternative remittance systems” such as hawala. In particular, 
Recommendation VI states that: “Each country should take measures to ensure that 
persons or legal entities, including agents, that provide a service for the transmission 
of money or value, including transmission through an informal money or value 
transfer system or network, should be licensed or registered and subject to all the 
FATF Recommendations that apply to banks and non-bank financial institutions. Each 
country should ensure that persons or legal entities that carry out this service illegally 
are subject to administrative, civil or criminal sanctions” (FATF, 2001, p.3). 
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Nowadays, ten years after this wave of concern for Anti-Money Laundering and 
Combating the Financing of Terrorism (AML/CFT), it is evident that the actions taken 
by countries to meet international standards and reporting requirements have 
created a huge burden, for low income countries without the appropriate capacity and 
resources in particular, and for the banking industry in general, while overall 
compliance with international standards is low (Verdugo, 2011). Consequently 
several authors (Passas, 2006c; Nakhai, 2007; Bowers, 2009) have stressed the 
necessity to find alternative strategies to achieve the objectives of AML/CFT policies 
and change the international approach towards hawala. An analogous debate has 
sprung up recently in an utterly different setting; on that of the global financial crisis. 
The global financial crisis is acknowledged to be the most severe economic 
downturn since the 1930s. For the first time since the Great Depression, the issues at 
stake have questioned the underpinning behavioral, moral and cultural aspects (Melé 
et al., 2011; Boddy, 2011; Fassin and Gosselin, 2011; Brown, 2010) and even the 
legitimacy of the financial system (Chomsky, 2011).  
As opposed to the conventional banking industry, Islamic banks seems to have 
avoided many of the most cruel consequences of the crisis, they have exhibited 
stronger resilience and they constitute one of the fastest growing segments in the 
global financial industry (Hassan and Dridi, 2010). One of the distinctive features that 
has enabled such performance has been the close bond that exists between financial 
practices and the real economy, which reduces the contribution to excesses and 
bubbles. This close relationship is just the result of the compliance with the precepts 
of Shariah —the legal code of Islam— in the performance and design of financial 
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practices that essentially prohibits riba —interest from money—, maysir —gambling, 
speculation—, gharar —unreasonable uncertainty— and it requires investment to be 
undertaken on the basis of halal —permitted— activities. These principles upon 
which financial life is structured make justice the core principle of Islamic economic 
system and, in this sense, justice has religious and ethical basis. 
In a similar fashion, hawala is a Shariah-compliant financial practice that 
ensures a close link with the real economy, especially through the financing of trade 
and the exchange of goods and services. Therefore, just like Islamic banking is, hawala 
constitutes a practical alternative approach to conventional finance (Tripp, 2006). 
However, it is necessary to address important governance issues and develop an 
effective legal framework for this specific type of systems in order to display their full 
potential (Mohieldin, 2012). 
 
Hawala operations 
Hawala transactions are characterized by speed, low costs, cultural 
convenience, versatility, reliability and potential anonymity: 
 Speed. Hawala transactions are usually completed within 24 hours. 
Remittances between the main international cities take an average of 6 to 12 hours (El 
Qorchi et al., 2003; Maimbo, 2003, 2005), although payments due in remote rural 
areas usually require more time, and they may take up to 48 hours (Passas, 2004). 
Sometimes hawaladars offer “express services” and they are able to deliver funds 
within very few hours.  
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 Cost. The volume of the transaction, the currency of exchange, the destination 
of the funds or the relationship between the remitter and the hawaladar are 
important features that may influence the cost of a hawala transaction. However 
hawala cost are always much lower than the fees charged in the formal banking 
system (see Table 2 for an example). El Qorchi et al. (2003) state that the cost of a 
hawala transaction averages around 2 to 5 percent of the total amount of the funds 
involved, although Maimbo (2005) report that these fees averaged 1 to 2 percent in 
Afghanistan. Passas (1999) offers several examples where hawaladars offer free 
services to their compatriots, in the corridor Australia-Africa. 
 Anonymity. This is the feature that has raised more concerns for western 
financial authorities, however it is not a specifically designed strategy but rather the 
outcome of the principles that rule hawala. The anonymity of the system is 
guaranteed by the fact that hawaladars’ records are not accessible to third parties and 
there are no standard document requirements for the clients who use the system. 
Hawaladars record all their transactions but with an eminently practical purpose, just 
to keep track of the state of their finances and their books are not intended to be 
opened to external auditors. On the other hand, the reputation of an individual is 
considered to be a sufficient guarantee of his honesty and so requirements such as 
Know Your Customer (KYC) are sometimes perceived as a pointless imposition by a 
foreign power (Razavy and Haggerty, 2009). Furthermore, in some regions where 
hawala operates, personal identification and documentation were never widely used, 
as it happens in Somalia (Houssein, 2005; Lindley, 2009). 
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 Cultural convenience. Hawala is frequently used as a remittance system for 
emigrants to send money to their families in their countries of origin. Many times 
these workers suffer cultural barriers language difficulties, low levels of education 
or even illiteracy in their host country that difficult their access to formal banks and 
also often the family in the home country is located in unbanked remote villages. 
Religious considerations are also an important reason why many users choose hawala 
over other remittance systems. Hawala is a Shariah-compliant mechanism in 
contrast with conventional Western banking and so it is a widespread practice in 
countries with Islamic traditions and among their expatriates. 
 Versatility. Hawaladars have always maintained their operations under 
extreme circumstances even when sometimes the formal banking system has not been 
able to adapt and ceased to operate. For instance, in Somalia after the Siad Barre 
government was deposed in 1991, commercial banks collapsed and hawala was the 
only financial system in the country (Houssein, 2005; Lindley, 2009). Similarly during 
the Taliban period in Kabul, the country’s formal banking system was not operational 
and hawaladars were the only active financial operators (Maimbo, 2005). These 
extreme circumstances show how in the context of institutional collapse, informal 
structures such as hawala may constitute a source of regulatory order.  
 Reliability. The reliability on hawala derives from the trust that governs the 
system and the versatility that it exhibits.  
Hawala practices have always been embedded in trade activity. Yet this 
relationship seems to have been disregarded by outsiders since the system is 
portrayed as a mere remittance vehicle forgetting that trade has been its core function 
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from its medieval origins right until the present time (Martin, 2009). Hawaladars are 
not exclusively dedicated to their remittance activities; rather they are usually 
entrepreneurs and small business owners ranging from small ethnic shops, 
convenient stores, import/export businesses and even other formal financial activity.  
Hawala transactions and settlement operations are usually intermingled with their 
business activity (Jost and Sandhu, 2000; Passas, 2006b). This embeddedness is highly 
efficient for two main reasons. On the one hand the business activity provides the pool 
of cash that hawaladars need for their daily operation out of which they make the 
payments due to complete the hawala transactions. And, on the other hand, the 
complementary businesses activities bring over the connections that hawaladars 
need; the network of partners and it is also the main source of clients. 
The organization of hawala has always followed the organization of 
commercial activity. Therefore, there is no formal hierarchy so that each individual is 
at the center of a particular web of relationships. The overall informal in the sense 
of unstructured and personal in nature organization results from the maze of 
individual relationships, which could bond a large number of people. The relations 
between the different members are personal and not uniform in intimacy and 
intensity. As Schramm and Taube (2003), Ballard (2005) and Schaeffer (2008) detail, 
a reputation mechanism enables to uphold cooperation within hawala networks. 
Every hawaladar has to put effort to construct a reputation of trustworthiness and 
competence in order to develop stable and reciprocal relations with his partners. The 
reputation of honest person actually permits an individual to credibly commit himself 
ex ante not to betray his partners ex post. Dishonest behavior is punished with 
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ostracism that entails economic losses and the correspondent damage to 
reputation that also involves social sanctions. 
The set of norms, customs, mores and traditions shared by the community 
also contributes to enforce the sustainability of this system based on trust. In this 
respect, Islam becomes remarkably imperative. The Shariah prohibition of gharar 
ambiguous contracts or deals discourages excessive uncertainty in contracts, and 
proscribes all forms of deception. In addition, Islam upholds contractual obligations 
and the disclosure of information as a sacred duty. This feature is intended to reduce 
the risk of asymmetric information and moral hazard. 
According to Udotvicht (1979) the prominence of status and personal 
relations and the social-personal relationships on which commercial and financial 
activities were embedded, have restrained the expansion of the networks beyond the 
social context of the local community for a long time. Yet, in the last decades, the 
migratory movements and the easy of communications that characterized the 
globalization process, have enabled the development of hawala networks on a global 
scale, while they still rely on a social construct founded on trust and status. 
At present, hawala is used for a wide variety of ends that exhibit different 
degrees of legitimacy and legal condition. Remittances from migrant workers are the 
most popular use of hawala. However, beyond working as a mere remittance 
mechanism, hawala has also helped to preserve social ties between a country and its 
diaspora (Thompson, 2011) through continuous interactions. Hawaladars constitute 
“a link between home and abroad” (Rahman and Yeoh, 2008).  
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In addition, different organizations and governments use hawaladars for the 
movement of aid money for humanitarian, emergency, and relief projects in conflict-
torn countries such as, for instance, Somalia (Lindley, 2009) or Afghanistan (Maimbo, 
2003; Thompson, 2011). 
In sum, hawala meets the financial needs of those who are excluded from the 
coverage of conventional banking system and in that sense it alleviates the financial 
exclusion of the minorities. 
However, hawala is also well tailored for other illegal ends. For instance, the 
system permits to circumvent capital and exchange controls, evade taxes and to 
transfer the proceeds from smuggling operations (El Qorchi et al., 2003) and from 
other illegal activities. As a matter of illustration, Thompson (2011) reports the close 
relationship of hawaladars and opium traders in Afghanistan. She conveys that 
hawaladars are aware that that their money transfers are intermingled with illegal 
activities, but for them that is an inevitable aspect of doing business in the region. 
Hawaladars view themselves “simply as a facilitator, transacting whenever the most 
profit will be generated” (p. 228). And in that sense, trade of illegal commodities 
provides a guaranteed source of liquidity. Moreover, hawaladars’ perception of what 
is “illicit” or “criminal” may differ from the that of global regulators, especially in 
contexts where many activities deemed criminal by the Western world, form what 
Goodhand (2005) has identified as the “coping” or “survival” economy. Thompson 
(2006) estimated that, in relation to drug trafficking, roughly 800USD million are 
remitted through hawala annually in Helmand (South Afghanistan) and in the range of 
300-500 USD million in Herat (West Afghanistan).  
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The main source of profit for hawaladars is the foreign exchange arbitrage 
between formal and parallel markets. Beyond local currencies, hawaladars use hard 
currencies mostly the U.S. Dollar for their operations mainly because they do not 
fluctuate excessively in the short run, they serve as a hedge against inflation and they 
are easily convertible to other currencies. 
Because hawaladars simultaneously emit and receive orders to deliver 
payments, each of them stays in a constantly shifting position of debit or credit with 
respect to other hawaladars operating within the hawala network (Ballard, 2005). 
Therefore hawaladars do not cancel outstanding debts individually, they rather 
compensate all claims and liabilities with a given partner and when the asymmetry 
between both positions is large enough, they clear off the resulting balance.  
When it comes to the settlement strategies, the most straightforward are 
reverse hawala transactions, that is, remittances or payments going in the opposite 
direction (El Qorchi et al. 2003). However, this kind of operations does not always 
occur since remittance flows are very asymmetrical and so other forms of settlement 
become more important. Hawaladars also turn to cash delivery by couriers to cancel 
their debts, although more often they use different types of formal financial 
instruments (Passas, 2004) and trade operations —such as the misinvoicing of 
imported or exported goods, bogus invoices for services or smuggling (El Qorchi et al., 
2003; Passas, 2004; Schaeffer, 2008)— to make compensatory payments to their 
creditors. 
 
The ethical dimension of hawala 
 17 
The moral legitimacy of hawala stems from the goal it pursues, the means 
employed to achieve it, the circumstances that surround the activity of hawaladars 
and the outcomes or consequences of their operations.  
When it comes to the ends of hawala, it is much complex than it seems to 
determine which goal provides moral justification for the activity of hawaladars. It is 
necessary to consider first the social contribution of hawala, and then the justification 
for the concern that these financial practices exhibit for international financial 
authorities. 
Hawala serves legitimate needs that cannot be met in other ways. On the one 
hand, hawaladars offer financial services to people that otherwise would be excluded 
from the system or would have to bear excessive costs to access to it. And on the other 
hand, hawala has proved to be the only practical alternative in the event of 
institutional collapse in many countries.  
As El Qorchi (personal interview, 13th December 2011, Washington D.C) claims, 
hawala fills the gap between the rich and the poor, the developed and less developed 
countries and it serves those segments of the population that are not targeted by the 
conventional banking —either because they lack economic appealing or because the 
system has not the capacity to service them. Hawala is unbeatable among “low profile” 
migrants and the financially excluded. In this context, AML/CTF regulation towards 
financial practices like hawala have produced the opposite from desired effects, 
including higher remittance costs, fewer options for remitters, unnecessary 
criminalization of economic sectors and ethnic groups, etc. (Passas, 2006a). In this 
sense, the regulation of hawala money transfers does not fit with ideas of “making 
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the best of globalization” or “making globalization work for the poor”(Watkins, 
2002; Stiglitz 2006).  
It is not easy to measure the social results or consequences of hawala given the 
informal nature of its modus operandi, yet hawaladars actually perform a chief role as 
a catalyst for the economic development and the reduction of poverty of local 
communities (Pieke et al., 2005, 2007; Lindley, 2009) —especially through the 
financing of trade activity and the transfer of flows of remittances or humanitarian aid 
and relieve money.  
Nevertheless, good intentions or positive social results are not sufficient in 
themselves; like in any human organization, hawaladars must also observe ethical 
criteria in their decisions, that is, in the means they make use of.  
Hawala constitutes a financial practice that is compliant with the precepts of 
the Shariah. The Islamic law, essentially communitarian, moral and religious, fosters 
the principles of justice, moral rectitude, obedience to God and the welfare of the 
ummah —community—, which all come together in the practice of hawala. Hawala is 
one of the few financial practices that are founded on a religious doctrine, therefore 
when adopting a position towards this system, it becomes imperative to think about 
ethical values beyond any other standards. 
The secrecy and opacity that surrounds hawala transactions have triggered the 
fear and mistrust of the West. Financial authorities (FATF, 2005) claim that informal 
financial practices like hawala could be easily misused for transmitting ill-gotten 
money, generated by different kinds of criminal, illegal and unethical activities. 
However, hawala is vulnerable to criminal abuse, just like all other financial 
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institutions (Passas, 2005), and more serious crimes are being committed through 
formal channels, including trade and financial intermediaries. Moreover, terrorist 
operations are often cheap as “a great deal of serious harm can be accomplished with 
just a few hundred US dollars, which are extremely easy to hide from anyone 
complying strictly with all current rules” (Passas, 2006a, p. 324). However this is not 
an excuse to leave hawaladars operate without any sort of control or surveillance. As 
it was clearly stated in the Abu Dhabi Declaration on Hawala (U.A.E Central Bank, 
2002), it is vital to ensure that the system is not abused by money launderers and 
terrorist financiers. 
Nevertheless it is important to notice that hawala has many of the features the 
formal banking system aspires to achieve low cost, speed, cultural convenience, 
reliability and versatility. Furthermore, “reliance on trust and reputation which are 
now portrayed (…) as deviant aspects of informal and criminal finance, have always 
played an important part in Western banking itself” (de Goede 2003, p. 516). The key 
difference is that nowadays trust is enforced differently in the formal financial sector 
through formal rules; judiciary and bureaucratic and in traditional practices like 
hawala. From this perspective, it was straightforward that the current regulatory 
approach towards hawala and similar cultural financial practices was doomed to fail. 
The regulatory mentality of the West is based in the absence of trust, whereas that is 
not true for hawala, in which financial relationships are grounded on the 
trustworthiness and the reputation of the individual rather than contract. As Passas 
(personal interview, 15th December 2011, Boston, MA) states “it makes no sense to 
apply the same measures to formal and informal financial practices”.  
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In order to effectively approach the activity of hawaladars in an ethical way it 
must be taken into account the complex, non-Western mechanism of economic 
governance that the system exhibits, as well as the particular circumstances  
economic, political and social situations of the communities in which hawala 
operates. It is also important to be aware of the ambiguous nature of this activity, 
which besides being informal from a Western point of view, it is connected with the 
formal economy in multiple ways. In addition, it is necessary to recognize that, just 
like it is true for other conventional financial practices, legitimate and illegitimate 
fields of action overlap in the context of hawala.  
Consequently, could we judge hawala appealing to a common body of ethics 
that shall foster the common good and promote justice? We agree with the 
Declaration of Parliament of the World’s Religions (1993) in the idea that rights 
without morality cannot long endure, and there will be no better global order without 
a global ethic, which could not be created or enforced by laws, prescriptions, and 
conventions alone. A common morality should embrace the essential values fostered 
both by Western and non-Western cultures, such as the respect and responsibility 
with regard to human dignity, personal and social responsibility, or global justice. 
Otherwise, such judgments would just be another disguised form of cultural 
imperialism. The later scenario is exemplified by the case of hawala in the last 
decades. These cultural financial practices have been tagged with labels such as 
“informal”, “underground” or “alternative” that have contributed to their 
“delegitimisation” and they have been relegated to an inferior or opposing position in 
relation to Western financial structures, which have implicitly been constructed as the 
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normal and legitimate space in international finance (de Goede, 2003; Thompson, 
2011). 
 
Concluding remarks 
In an increasingly globalized world, cultural diversity and the existence of 
different moral perceptions are relevant questions not only in business ethics but also 
in international financial arena, as it is exemplified in the case of hawala. Within the 
debate of the existence of universal principles, hawala makes us think over the 
relationship among legality, formality and morality. 
Ten years after the wave of concern for AML/CTF, cultural financial traditions 
like hawala have acquired a new significance in the context of the global financial 
crisis, as financial institutions grounded on core tenets of Islam seems to have 
weathered the storm better. Yet there are important regulatory and governance issues 
that need to be addressed for these systems to unfold their full potential (Hassan and 
Dridi 2010; Mohieldin, 2012). Moreover, it is vital to adopt the necessary measures to 
ensure that practices like hawala are not abused by terrorism and organized crime. 
This paper has discussed the economic, social and ethical features of hawala, 
all of which must be taken into account when judging its operations. Hawala is one of 
the few financial practices that are founded on a religious credo, and so it becomes 
imperative to think about ethical values beyond any other standards when designing a 
legal framework for the system. It is important to point out that even though hawala is 
based on ethical values that are Islamic, they are much more general and not only 
confined to this religious tradition. In deed, other ethics from ancient time (McCulloch, 
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1863 as cited by Termes, 1995), emphasize similar principles to foster the relation 
between finance and the real sector.  
It seems that the practice of hawala existed long before its codification in 
Islamic law in the Middle Ages and since then, it has become longstanding element of 
the cultural landscape of many countries in Southeast Asia, the Middle East and Africa. 
In the last decade hawala has undergone a considerable growth and the global 
expansion although its modus operandi still exhibits its traditional “mixed 
embeddedness” (Thompson, 2011, p. 140) of cultural codes, rational economic 
principles and social affiliations. Nowadays, the main challenge that hawala poses is 
the problem of its secrecy, in which two fundamental principles conflict with each 
other; the respect for individual privacy and the protection against possible illegal 
acts. It is obvious that hawala, created centuries ago, put much less emphasis on this 
second principle, but this does not turn the system immoral now, but in any case, 
more risky from the point of view of public ethics or politics. 
Hawala constitutes an important institution for its clients, the local 
communities and the society in general. Given the analysis carried out in this paper, it 
seems that evidence supports the idea that hawala is based on an ethically right 
motivation; there are positive outcomes or consequences —even though there are 
some weaknesses that need to be amended in order to avoid any abuse—, and the 
circumstances in which hawaladars operates justify their operations. Consequently, if 
the practice is carried out with honesty, prudence and reasonableness, it deserved a 
positive ethical appraisal. Yet, it must be acknowledged that the opacity that 
surrounds the activity of hawaladars forbids the track of a financial crime when it has 
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been already committed. Moreover, provided the informal nature of hawala, there 
may be further undesired indirect effects typical of any underground activity. 
Although there is evidence that has proved the link between hawala and 
organized crime in a bunch of cases, it is very dangerous to make the association 
between both systems directly because, as Maimbo (personal interview, 1st December 
2011, Washington D.C) insists, that would create the fake illusion that if we get to kill 
hawala that would be the end of the financing of organized crime. Hawala is not the 
panacea in the fight against organized crime; criminal money flows through the hands 
of hawaladars just as through any other conventional financial mechanism. 
Hawaladars exhibit financial know-how, they are able to mobilize important 
sums of money, they understand local markets and they enjoy a strong reputation 
among the poor. Thus, they have the potential to become essential elements in the 
goal of “banking the unbanked”, by offering the delivery of financial services to rural 
and remote areas that are currently outside the reach of the conventional financial 
system. 
Hence it becomes more necessary than ever to bring about a change towards a 
more ethically, culturally and economically sensitive approach. There should be a 
greater integration of law and ethics so that the ethical purpose of the law becomes 
evident. In this respect, it is necessary to focus on “hyper-norms” or fundamental 
principles inherent to humanity which are common to both “formal” and “informal”, 
“Western” and “non-Western” financial practices. This is the only way that hawala 
could develop its full potential and become a vehicle for financial and economic 
development. 
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